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I. Introduction 
The financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been a subject of great 
interest both to policymakers and researchers because of the significance of SMEs in private 
sectors around the world and the perception that these firms are financially constrained. Data 
collected by Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirgüç-Kunt (2007) for 76 developed and developing 
countries indicate that, on average, SMEs account for close to 60 percent of manufacturing 
employment. More importantly, a number of studies using firm-level survey data have shown 
that SMEs not only perceive access to finance and the cost of credit to be greater obstacles than 
large firms, but these factors constrain SMEs (i.e., affect their performance) more than large 
firms (Schiffer and Weder, 2001; IADB, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; 
and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic, 2006).  
Furthermore, in recent years a debate has emerged regarding the nature of bank financing 
for SMEs. Until recently, the conventional wisdom regarding SME finance was that small and 
domestic banks are more prone to finance SMEs because they are better suited to engage in 
“relationship lending”, a type of financing based primarily on “soft” information gathered by the 
loan officer through continuous, personalized, direct contacts with SMEs, their owners and 
managers, and the local community in which they operate (see Berger, Kayshap, and Scalise, 
1995; Keeton, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1996; and Strahan and Weston, 1996; Berger et al., 2001; 
Mian, 2006; and Sengupta, 2007). However, some recent studies (see Berger and Udell, 2006; 
Berger, Rosen and Udell, 2007; and de la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2008) have 
begun to dispute this conventional wisdom and proposed a new paradigm for bank SME finance, 
arguing that large and foreign banks, relative to other institutions, can have a comparative 
advantage at financing SMEs through arms-length lending technologies (e.g., asset-based 2 
 
lending, factoring, leasing, fixed-asset lending, credit scoring, etc.) and centralized 
organizational structures instead of relationship lending.  
This paper tries to inform this recent debate using newly gathered data for 91 large banks 
from 45 countries. Specifically, the literature discussed above proposing a new paradigm for 
bank SME finance suggests some hypotheses that have not been formally tested empirically, 
which our study tries to examine. First, these studies suggest that there should be few if any 
differences in the extent, type, and pricing of SME loans across bank ownership types. Second, 
these studies argue that there might be differences in the lending technologies and organizational 
structures that different bank types adopt. Third, however, because a variety of lending 
technologies and organizational structures might be suitable to finance SMEs, in practice, there 
should be no clear link between bank SME finance and the type of lending technologies and 
organizational structures that banks have in place, after controlling for bank and country type. In 
particular, it need not be the case that SME finance is based on relationship lending, which relies 
on the use of soft information and a decentralized organizational structure. Finally, our study also 
tries to examine differences in SME financing across countries. 
Our paper focuses on large banks as opposed to other financial institutions because 
studies have shown that banks are the main source of external finance for SMEs across countries 
(see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maskimovic, 2008). Furthermore, we concentrate on large banks 
due to their systemic importance and their significance as potential SME financiers.
1 However, 
there are undoubtedly some selection biases that might arise from restricting our sample to large 
banks. First, we might be leaving out some domestic niche banks (for example cooperative 
                                                            
1 Large banks are also the ones with the most extensive branch networks and, hence, the ones most accessible to 
SMEs, at least in terms of location.  
 3 
 
banks) that are especially focused on SME lending. Second, to the extent that large banks around 
the world are more likely to be similar to each other in terms of lending technologies and 
organizational structures, and given that most foreign banks in developing countries tend to be 
large, focusing only on large banks might downplay potential differences in lending technologies 
and organizational structures across bank ownership types.   
Our results lend support to the recent literature advocating a new paradigm in SME 
finance. We find few differences in the extent, type, and pricing of SME loans across foreign, 
private, and government-owned banks, even though different bank ownership types apply 
different lending technologies and organizational structures. For example, foreign banks seem 
more likely to use hard information in loan assessments, grant a higher share of collateralized 
loans, and keep loan approval and risk management decisions centralized. Instead, we find 
significant differences across banks in developed and developing countries driven by differences 
in the economic, institutional, and legal environment, as opposed to differences in lending 
technologies and organizational structures. In particular, banks in developing countries provide a 
lower share of investment loans and charge higher fees and interest rates than those in developed 
countries. Finally, the link between lending technologies, organizational structures, and SME 
financing is not consistent with the view that SME lending is based on relationship lending, since 
we find that the use of hard information and credit scoring is positively linked to the share of 
SME lending to total lending and the SME loan approval rate, respectively. 
This paper is closely linked to and builds on a number of previous International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and World Bank initiatives to better understand banks’ involvement with 
SMEs (see World Bank 2007a,b; De la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler, 2008; Stephanou 
and Rodriguez, 2008). However, there are some important differences between our paper and the 4 
 
aforementioned studies. First, we cover many more countries than the other studies. In particular, 
we try to compare findings for multiple developed and developing countries. Second, our 
questionnaire and this study places greater emphasis on obtaining and analyzing quantitative data 
on the extent, type, and pricing of bank financing to SMEs than the other studies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the survey used to 
gather our data. Section III investigates the extent, type, and pricing of bank financing to SMEs 
across countries and across bank ownership types, while Section IV examines differences in 
some aspects of the lending technologies and organizational structures used to serve SMEs. 
Section V puts both issues together by looking into the link between lending technologies/ 
organizational structures and the extent, type, and pricing of bank financing to SMEs. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II. The  Survey 
To gather information on bank financing to SMEs around the world, we designed a 
survey with 56 questions on three areas: (1) documenting banks’ perceptions regarding the SME 
segment, (2) understanding banks’ business models (in particular, lending technologies and 
organizational structures) used to serve SME, and (3) quantifying the extent, type, and pricing of 
bank financing to SMEs.
2  
Using data from Bankscope, we identified the five largest commercial banks in terms of 
assets in close to 80 countries around the world and invited them to respond to our survey 
throughout 2007. Table 1 lists the countries that responded to our survey, shows the number of 
banks that participated from each country, along with the banks’ combined market share.  In 
                                                            
2 The working paper version of this paper (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2008) provides more 
information regarding banks’ perceptions of the SME segment, discusses the perceived drivers and obstacles to 
SME finance, and examines banks’ views of government programs to support SME finance. 5 
 
total, we obtained responses from 91 banks in 45 countries. On average, the banks that responded 
account for 32% of banking system loans in each country. The loan market share exceeds 30% 
for 24 countries. For 25 countries, we were able to get a response from the largest bank in the 
system.  We obtained multiple bank responses for 30 countries: for 4 countries we got 4 banks to 
respond in each country, for 8 countries we received responses from 3 banks, and for 18 
countries we obtained 2 bank responses. Only one bank responded in 15 countries.  
Among the 45 countries in our sample, 38 are developing and the remaining 7 are 
developed. Our dataset covers 14 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 9 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 8 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in South Asia, 2 in the Middle East and 
North Africa and 1 in East Asia. All 7 developed countries are in Western Europe.  
  As summarized in Table 2, our survey includes 11 banks operating in developed 
countries and 80 banks operating in developing countries.  In terms of bank ownership types, our 
sample includes 17 government-owned banks (one operating in a developed economy and the 
remaining 16 in developing countries), 32 domestic private banks (6 in developed countries and 
26 in developing countries) and 42 foreign-owned banks (4 in developed countries and 38 in 
developing countries).   
Rather than giving banks a predetermined size classification of firms, the survey asked 
banks to provide their own definition of small and medium-sized firms. In particular, banks were 
asked to provide a range in terms of sales, assets, or employees. Most banks (85%) define SMEs 
in terms of annual sales. In particular, on average, banks define small firms as those with annual 
sales between 200,000 and 4 million U.S. dollars and medium-sized firms as those with sales 6 
 
between 2 and 16 million dollars.
3 The average midpoint of the range for small firms is 2 million 
dollars and for medium-sized firms is 9 million dollars. 
The definition of an SME is not very different across banks. Figures 1a and 1b plot the 
cumulative frequency of the midpoint for the range provided as definition for small and medium- 
sized firms, respectively. Close to 70 percent of banks define small and medium-sized firms as 
those with sales of less than 2.5 and 10 million dollars, respectively. Furthermore, the definition 
provided by banks is remarkably similar to the average annual sales reported by small and 
medium-sized firms in recent enterprise surveys conducted by The World Bank for the countries 
in our sample: 1.8 million dollars in the case of small firms (defined in the enterprise surveys as 
those with less than 20 employees) and 14.5 million dollars in the case of medium-sized firms 
(those with 20 to 99 employees). Since the enterprise survey samples are constructed to be 
representative of the universe of firms in each country, this suggests that banks are defining 
SMEs in a way that is consistent with the actual size distribution of firms. In other words, these 
statistics reduce the concern that banks’ definition of SMEs refers to firms that are substantially 
larger than those operating in the countries in our sample. 
 
III – The extent, type, and pricing of SME lending across countries and bank types 
In this section, we examine whether the extent, type, and pricing of SME lending varies 
across countries and by bank ownership type in a way consistent with a number of hypotheses 
put forward in the literature on SME finance. First, we examine whether are there marked 
differences in the extent and pricing of SME lending across bank ownership types.  On the one 
hand, some country case studies suggest that foreign banks are less likely to engage in SME 
                                                            
3 Banks were asked to provide a range for their definition of small and medium-sized firms. The averages mentioned 
here refer to the lower and upper limits of the range provided by each bank. 7 
 
lending because they tend to adopt arms-length lending technologies and have centralized and 
hierarchical organizational structures (e.g., see Mian, 2006; Gormley, 2007; Sengupta, 2007). On 
the other hand, recent analytical and empirical studies proposing a new paradigm for SME 
finance argue the opposite, while at the same time acknowledging differences in lending 
technologies and organizational structures between foreign and domestic banks (see Berger and 
Udell, 2006 and de la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2008).
4 When it comes to 
government-owned banks, while they are frequently charged with serving specific borrower 
groups, such as SMEs, studies have found that they often do not fulfill this task (See Berger et 
al., 2008 and Cole, 2009).    
Second, we explore differences in the extent, type and pricing of SME finance across 
countries. The literature on private credit depth suggests that lending will be affected by the 
economic, institutional and legal environment in the country (see Djankov et al., 2007).   
Furthermore, studies using firm-level data show that these factors disproportionally affect SMEs’ 
access to external financing and growth (see Beck et al., 2005, 2006, 2008). Here, we use supply-
side data to shed further light on this question.  
To examine the different hypotheses discussed above, we estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
Yi,f=α0+ α1SEi,f + α2Foreigni + α3Privatei + α4Devi + ei,f     (1) 
 
                                                            
4 Firm-level evidence also shows that SME access to finance improves with greater foreign bank entry (see Clarke et 
al., 2006 and Giannetti and Ongena, 2009).   8 
 
where i refers to the bank and f identifies whether the response given by each bank i pertains to 
small or medium-sized firms.
5 Y stands, alternatively, for the share of lending to SMEs (out of 
total lending), the percentage of loan applications approved, the share of SME loans devoted to 
investment, the fees charged on SME loans (as a percentage of the loan amount), and the interest 
rate charged on SME loans.  SE identifies responses corresponding to small firm as opposed to 
medium-sized enterprise financing. Foreign is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank is 
foreign-owned. Private takes the value of 1 if the bank is domestic and privately-owned. Finally, 
Dev is a dummy that equals 1 for banks that operate in developing countries. Because all these 
variables are percentages, we use a Tobit model to estimate equation (1).
6 
The results from estimating equation (1), shown in Table 3, indicate that controlling for 
country type (i.e., distinguishing between developed and developing countries), there are few 
significant differences in the extent, type, and pricing of SME lending across bank ownership 
types. Most notably, we find no evidence that foreign banks tend to lend less to SMEs than other 
banks. These results are in line with studies that discuss a new paradigm in SME lending where 
different bank types are able to serve SMEs using different lending technologies (see Berger and 
Udell, 2006; and de la Torre et al, 2008). Relative to government-owned banks, private banks 
approve a lower percentage of SME loan applications and foreign banks seem to charge higher 
fees. However, these differences are significant only at the 10 percent significance level. The 
results described in this paragraph remain unchanged if we focus exclusively on a sample of 
banks in developing countries, instead of controlling for a developing country dummy, as seen in 
                                                            
5 In other words, we stack bank responses so that we have at most two observations per bank: one corresponding to 
small firm financing and the other to medium-sized firm financing. We also test the robustness of our findings 
running separate regressions for small and medium enterprises.  
6 Results do not change in any significant way if we conduct ordinary least squares as opposed to Tobit estimations. 9 
 
appendix Table A.1. Finally, we do not find any significant differences between small and 
medium enterprises, as the dummy for small enterprises never enters significantly.  
Controlling for bank ownership types, Table 3 reveals statistically and economically 
significant differences in the type and pricing of SME finance across banks operating in 
developing versus developed countries. In particular, we find that the share of SME lending 
devoted to investments (i.e., long-run lending) is statistically and economically significantly 
lower (28 percentage points lower) among banks in developing countries. At the same time, 
banks in developing countries charge 0.7 percentage point higher fees and seven percentage 
points higher interest rates than those in developed countries. On the other hand, there are no 
statistically significant differences in the share of loans to SMEs or in the percentage of SME 
applications approved.  
Table 4 shows how different features of the economic, legal, and institutional 
environment across countries affect the extent, type, and pricing of SME lending. Here we 
replace the developing country dummy with specific measures of the environment banks operate 
in.  In particular, we examine the influence of variables that capture the cost of enforcing 
contracts (expressed as a percentage of the value of the claims), the cost of registering property 
(expressed as a percentage of the value of the property) that can be used as loan collateral, the 
availability of credit history information (expressed as an index between 0 and 6, with higher 
numbers meaning that credit history information is richer and more widely available in a 
country), and the degree of protection of property rights. The first three variables come from the 
World Bank Doing Business Indicators Database.
7 The measure of property rights is part of the 
Index of Economic Freedom reported by the Heritage Foundation. Property rights protection is 
                                                            
7 See http://www.doingbusiness.org. 10 
 
an index between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating greater protection of property 
rights. 
    The results in Table 4 suggest that the differences between banks in developed and 
developing countries in terms of the extent, type and pricing of SME loans are driven by 
differences in the environment these banks operate in. It seems that the environment is especially 
important for the maturity and pricing of SME loans.  Specifically, we find that in countries with 
a higher cost of registering collateral, banks grant a smaller share of loans to SME, devote a 
smaller share of those loans to investment purposes, and charge higher fees. Similarly, in 
countries with higher costs of enforcing contracts, banks approve a smaller share of SME loan 
applications and charge higher interest rates. In contrast, banks in countries with a better credit 
information environment approve a higher share of SME loans, devote a higher percentage of 
SME loans to investment purposes, and charge lower fees and interest rates. Similarly, in 
countries with better property rights, banks grant a higher percentage of SME loans for 
investment purposes, and charge lower fees and interest rates.
8 
  In summary, Tables 3 and 4, show that it is mainly differences between banks in 
developing and developed countries that explain differences in the extent, type and pricing of 
SME lending, rather than differences in bank ownership type.  Furthermore, consistent with 
previous studies, our results reveal that differences in SME financing between banks in 
developed and developing countries seem to be explained by differences in the economic, legal, 




8 We do not present regression results with all variables together given the high correlation between different 
measures of legal, institutional and political development.  11 
 
IV - Lending technologies and organizational structures across countries and banks 
Do banks in different countries adopt different lending technologies and organizational 
structures to lend to SMEs? Controlling for country type, do we observe significant differences 
across government, private, and foreign-owned banks? Some studies suggest that foreign banks 
are more likely to use credit scoring models, base their loan decision making on hard 
information, require collateral when granting loans, and keep loan approval and risk management 
processes centralized (e.g., Berger et al., 2001,  Mian, 2006). In order to answer these questions, 
we estimate equation (2): 
 
Zi,f = α0+ α1SEi,f + α2Foreigni+ α3Privatei + α4Devi + ei,f                 (2) 
 
where again i refers to the bank and f identifies whether the response given by each bank i 
pertains to small or medium-sized firms. Z captures some aspects of the lending technology and 
the organizational structures used in SME lending. In particular, we consider six separate 
dimensions: Use of scoring is a variable that takes the value of 0 if scoring is not used by the 
bank, 1 if the bank uses scoring only as an input in lending decisions, and 2 if loan approval is 
completely done by scoring. Use of hard information is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
bank considers hard information (i.e., the financial assessment of the business, the existence of 
collateral or the availability of credit history information from a credit registry) as the main 
criterion to determine whether to grant a loan and 0 if it uses primarily soft information (such as 
owner characteristics, credit history with the bank, size of the loan, or purpose of the loan). Share 
of SME loans secured is the percentage of SME loans that is collateralized. Decentralization of 
loan approval is a variable that takes the value 0 if all lending decisions are made primarily at 12 
 
the bank headquarters, 1 if decisions are made at headquarters and branches, 2 if decisions are 
made primarily at branches, and 3 if they are made only at branches. Similarly, Decentralization 
of risk management is a variable that takes the value 0 if all risk management decisions are made 
primarily at the bank headquarters, 1 if decisions are made at headquarters and branches, 2 if 
decisions are made primarily at branches, and 3 if they are made only at branches. As before, SE 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for responses corresponding to lending to small firms; 
Foreign takes the value of 1 if the bank is foreign owned;  Private is 1 if the bank is domestic 
privately-owned; Dev is 1 if the bank operates in a developing country. Because the use of 
scoring and the extent of decentralization are discrete ordinal variables, we estimate those 
equations as ordered probits. In the case of the use of hard information, because the dependent 
variables is a discrete 0/1 variable, we run a probit model. Finally, we use a tobit model to 
estimate the share of secured loans made out to SMEs. 
Table 5 shows that most of the differences across banks in lending technologies and 
organizational structures are explained by different ownership types, while there are few 
significant differences between banks in developing and developed countries. The only 
significant difference between small and medium-sized enterprises is that banks are more likely 
to use scoring for small than for medium-sized enterprise lending. We do not find any significant 
differences across countries or bank types in terms of the use of scoring as a lending technology. 
In terms of the type of information used for loan approval, the results in the second column of 
Table 5 show that foreign banks are more likely to use hard information relative to private 
domestic banks. While the coefficient on the developing country dummy is negative, it is not 
significant, so we cannot confirm that hard information is used significantly more in developed 
countries. The share of SME loans that is secured is higher among foreign than domestic banks 13 
 
and among banks in developing relative to developed countries. Private domestic banks also 
have a lower share of secured SME lending than government-owned banks.  As for the extent of 
decentralization in lending decisions and risk management, we find that decentralization is more 
common among government-owned banks and foreign banks tend to be least likely to 
decentralize loan decision making and risk management. 
 
V – Linking SME finance with lending technologies and organizational structures  
To what extent do differences in lending technologies and organizational structures affect 
the amount, type, and pricing of SME loans? While traditionally the literature has claimed that 
SME lending is largely based on soft information and relationship lending, studies proposing a 
new paradigm argue that different lending technologies can be applied to SME finance (see 
Berger and Udell, 2006 and de la Torre et al., 2008). At the same time, some studies have shown 
that credit scoring can mitigate the need for relationship lending in SME finance (Frame et al., 
2004 and Berger, et al., 2005). Finally, studies such as Stein (2002), Mian (2006), and Liberti 
and Mian (2009) have argued that more centralized and hierarchical organizational structures can 
have a negative impact on lending to opaque borrowers, such as SMEs. 
In order to test the effect of SME lending technologies and organizational structures on 
the extent, type and pricing of SME lending, we estimate the model in equation (3), which 
combines those described in equations (1) and (2) above. Thus, we assess the marginal impact of 
lending technologies and organizational structures (captured by Z) on the extent, type and pricing 
of SME finance (as measured by Y), after controlling for bank ownership (Foreign and Private) 
and country types (Dev). 
 14 
 
Yi,f=α0+ α1SEi,f + α2Foreigni + α3Privatei + α4Devi + Zi,f + ei,f     (3) 
 
The results in Table 6 suggest that the link between lending technologies, organizational 
structures, and SME financing is not consistent with the notion that SME financing is based on 
relationship lending, since we find that the use of hard information is positively associated with a 
higher percentage of SME loans (albeit at 10 percent significance level) and the use of credit 
scoring is positively correlated with the percentage of SME loans approved.
9 The share of loans 
that is secured does not seem to be related to any of the dependent variables. Finally, the extent 
of decentralization in loan approvals appears to be negatively associated with interest rates, but 




This paper used data from a survey of large banks around the world to study how SME 
financing by large banks differs across countries and bank ownership types and to investigate the 
link between lending technologies/organizational structures and SME finance. Our data yield a 
number of interesting findings. First, we find that, relative to banks in developed countries, banks 
in developing countries provide a lower share of investment loans and charge higher fees and 
interest rates. Second, differences across countries seem to be driven by differences in the 
economic, institutional, and legal environment. Third, even though we find differences in the 
lending technologies and organizational structures used across bank ownership types, we find 
few significant differences in the extent, type and pricing of SME. Finally, controlling for bank 
                                                            
9 If we exclude the bank ownership dummies , we find stronger evidence against the notion that SME financing  is 
based on relationship lending, since the variable use of hard information becomes positive and significant at the 5 
percent and the findings on credit scoring remain the same. These results are available upon request. 15 
 
characteristics and bank ownership types, we find that the link between lending technologies, 
organizational structures, and SME lending is not consistent with the notion that SME finance is 
based on relationship lending, a type of financing rooted in the use of soft information and 
decentralized organizational structures. Overall, our findings are consistent with studies that 
propose a new paradigm for SME lending, where different bank types, applying different lending 
technologies and organizational structures can play an important role in financing SMEs (see 
Berger and Udell, 2006 and de la Torre et al., 2008). 
  While a large literature has used firm-level data to analyze differences in access to 
finance by firm size, this paper is a first step in better understanding SME financing from the 
supply side using cross-country data.  Going forward, it would be interesting to expand the 
number of banks and countries surveyed in order to see if we can corroborate our findings in a 
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Table 1: Characteristics of survey respondents 
Table shows the countries in our sample, the number of banks that responded from each country (including whether the largest bank 
has participated in the survey), and the market share of respondents relative to total loans. 
Country  No. of bank 
respondents 
Has largest bank responded?  Market share covered 
Albania 3  Yes 59%
Armenia 3  Yes  35% 
Austria 1    1% 
Belarus 1  Yes  48% 
Belgium 1    10% 
Bosnia 2  Yes  38% 
Brazil 1    9% 
Bulgaria 2  Yes  32% 
Chile 1    19% 
Colombia 3  Yes  48% 
Costa Rica  2  Yes  31% 
Croatia 2    22% 
Ecuador 1  Yes    38% 
El Salvador   1    26% 
Ethiopia 1    16% 
Finland 1  Yes  38% 
Georgia 3    47% 
Greece 2  Yes  33% 
Honduras 2    29% 
Hungary 2  Yes  35% 
India 4  Yes  41% 
Indonesia 2    20% 
Jordan 1    6% 
Kenya 2  Yes  27% 
Lebanon 3  Yes  37% 
Lithuania 3    48% 
Malawi 2  Yes  65% 
Malta 3  Yes  71% 
Mexico 2  Yes  23% 
Moldova 2    35% 
Nepal 1    8% 
Pakistan 1  Yes  14% 
Poland 1    8% 
Sierra Leone  2    21% 
Slovakia 2  Yes  40% 
Slovenia 4  Yes  61% 
South Africa  2  Yes  11% 
Sri Lanka  4  Yes  69% 
Swaziland 1    35% 
Sweden 1    27% 
Switzerland 2  Yes  40% 
Turkey 3  Yes  24% 
Uruguay 2  Yes  46% 
Zambia 2    28% 
Zimbabwe 4    25% 20 
 
 
Table 2:  Number of banks in the sample by country and bank ownership type 
Country\ 
Ownership type 
Developed  Developing  Total 
Foreign  4  38  32 
Private domestic  6  26  42 
Government  1  16  17 




















Table 3: The extent, type, and pricing of SME lending across countries and bank ownership types 









(% of SME  
loan amount) 
Interest rate on 
SME loan 
(%) 
Developing  0.802  3.2  -28.113  0.712  6.899 
  [0.47]  [0.28]  [4.11]***  [4.42]***  [8.80]*** 
Small firm lending  -2.227  -2.701  -1.983  0.149  1.026 
  [1.37]  [0.56]  [0.44]  [0.81]  [1.08] 
Foreign bank  0.964  -8.009  -4.674  0.322  -0.41 
  [0.42]  [1.64]  [0.73]  [1.84]*  [0.38] 
Private bank  -0.982  -10.217  -7.897  0.396  1.635 
  [0.41]  [1.93]*  [1.19]  [1.48]  [1.40] 
Constant  8.707  84.086  76.737  -0.029  3.688 
  [3.65]***  [7.31]***  [9.75]***  [0.13]  [3.26]*** 
Observations  94  77  110  136  127 
Pseudo R-squared  0.01  0  0.02  0.02  0.03 
F-stat:   Foreign=Private  1.1  0.16  0.43  0.09  3.33 
P-value: Foreign=Private  0.3  0.69  0.52  0.76  0.07 
Robust t-statistics are in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 22 
 
Table 4: The impact of the economic, institutional, and legal environment on the extent, type, and pricing of SME lending 
  Share of SME lending (%)  SME Loan approval (%)  Share of SME loans for invest. (%) 
Small firm lending  -1.833  -2.199  -1.713  -1.875  -0.296  -2.761  -0.067  0.129  -3.006  -2.914  -2.939  -3.028 
  [1.13]  [1.35]  [1.02]  [1.09]  [0.06]  [0.59]  [0.01]  [0.03]  [0.64]  [0.65]  [0.61]  [0.61] 
Foreign bank  1.384  0.878  1.651  1.616  -6.997  -8.349  -7.112  -6.813  -8.18  -2.275  -5.637  -6.29 
  [0.57]  [0.38]  [0.68]  [0.66]  [1.43]  [1.70]*  [1.58]  [1.34]  [1.26]  [0.35]  [0.88]  [0.90] 
Private bank  -1.638  -1.092  -0.385  -0.654  -10.429  -9.527  -12.268  -12.988  -2.472  -2.177  -4.628  -4.148 
  [0.65]  [0.46]  [0.16]  [0.25]  [2.05]**  [2.03]**  [2.57]**  [2.53]**  [0.36]  [0.33]  [0.69]  [0.56] 
Cost of property   -0.491        -0.506        -1.768       
registration  [2.68]***        [1.16]        [3.34]***       
Property Rights    -0.014        0.231        0.501     
    [0.38]        [1.64]        [4.41]***     
Credit info. index      -0.58        2.773        3.446   
      [1.53]        [2.51]**        [2.61]**   
Cost of contract         -0.001        -0.251        -0.042 
enforcement        [0.03]        [3.67]***        [0.71] 
Constant  11.09  10.122  10.594  8.754  89.95  76.801  79.045  96.968  60.417  27.557  39.399  51.711 
  [4.75]***  [3.78]***  [4.42]***  [3.20]***  [17.86]***  [8.98]***  [16.32]***  [18.01]***  [9.39]***  [3.22]***  [5.51]***  [7.42]*** 
Observations  90  94  90  90  74  77  74  74  104  110  104  104 
Pseudo R-squared  0.01  0.01  0.01  0  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0 
F-stat: Foreign=Private  3.24  1.14  1.36  1.59  0.42  0.05  1.07  1.72  1.13  0  0.04  0.15 
P-value: Foreign=Private  0.08  0.29  0.25  0.21  0.52  0.82  0.3  0.19  0.29  0.98  0.85  0.7 
Robust t statistics in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




Table 4: The impact of the economic, institutional, and legal environment on the extent, type, and pricing of SME lending (continued) 
  Fee (% of SME loan amount)  Interest rate on SME loan(%) 
Small firm lending  0.159  0.173  0.194  0.177  1.066  1.174  1.074  1.157 
  [0.97]  [0.98]  [1.07]  [0.91]  [1.01]  [1.23]  [1.12]  [1.20] 
Foreign bank  0.383  0.247  0.324  0.338  -0.443  -1.417  -0.548  -0.561 
  [2.18]**  [1.33]  [1.76]*  [1.78]*  [0.36]  [1.40]  [0.48]  [0.52] 
Private bank  0.186  0.294  0.354  0.325  0.825  0.491  1.236  0.457 
  [0.78]  [1.17]  [1.39]  [1.18]  [0.66]  [0.45]  [0.99]  [0.38] 
Cost of property   0.106        0.138       
registration  [5.73]***        [0.93]       
Property Rights    -0.016        -0.113     
    [3.79]***        [6.56]***     
Credit info. index      -0.193        -1.316   
      [4.08]***        [4.57]***   
Cost of contract         0.002        0.075 
enforcement        [1.31]        [3.84]*** 
Constant  0.123  1.372  1.241  0.572  9.51  15.636  14.7  7.577 
  [0.63]  [4.79]***  [5.37]***  [2.76]***  [6.99]***  [13.00]***  [10.42]***  [6.29]*** 
Observations  130  136  130  130  123  127  123  123 
Pseudo R-squared  0.12  0.04  0.05  0.01  0  0.03  0.03  0.03 
F-stat: Foreign=Private  0.93  0.04  0.02  0  1.01  2.74  2.62  0.8 
P-value: Foreign=Private  0.34  0.84  0.9  0.96  0.32  0.1  0.11  0.37 
Robust t statistics in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 24 
 
 
Table 5: Lending technologies and organizational structures across countries and bank ownership types 
  Use of scoring  Use of hard information  Share of SME loans 
secured (%) 
Decentralization of 
 loan approvals 
Decentralization of  
risk management 
 
Developing  -0.007  -0.248  27.4  -0.459  -0.613   
  [0.03]  [0.79]  [2.82]***  [1.58]  [1.80]*   
Small firm lending  0.364  -0.056  -2.291  0.248  0.206   
  [2.00]**  [0.27]  [0.35]  [1.47]  [1.13]   
Foreign bank  0.003  0.363  3.727  -1.205  -0.981   
  [0.01]  [1.25]  [0.45]  [4.89]***  [3.65]***   
Private bank  0.105  -0.399  -17.033  -0.838  -0.229   
  [0.43]  [1.36]  [2.02]**  [3.72]***  [0.96]   
Observations  167  164  137  173  168   
Pseudo R-squared  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.08  0.08   
Chi
2 test: Foreign =Private  0.26  10.79  7.18  3.55  13.81   
P-value: Foreign =Private  0.61  0  0.01  0.06  0   
Robust z statistics in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
       




Table 6: The impact of lending technologies and organizational structures on the extent, size and pricing of lending to SMEs 
 
  Share of SME lending (%)    SME loan approval (%)  Share of SME loans for investments (%) 
Developing 
0.678 1.001 0.548 0.81  1.34  5.692 4.435 25.031  2.542 5.22  -27.768  -28.849  -26.084  -27.777  -27.375   
 
[0.39] [0.57] [0.22] [0.46] [0.89] [0.48] [0.40] [1.01] [0.19] [0.47] [3.84]***  [4.17]***  [2.93]***  [4.00]***  [3.61]***   
Small firm 
lending 
-1.949 -1.799 -1.701 -2.504 -1.748 -0.904 -4.709 -0.444 -3.058 -1.895 -0.224 -1.914 -2.116 -2.15  -2.886   
 
[1.18] [1.02] [0.92] [1.51] [1.05] [0.18] [1.01] [0.09] [0.68] [0.42] [0.05] [0.41] [0.43] [0.47] [0.61]   
Foreign bank 
1.312  1.164  1.645  1.774  0.649  -13.657  -8.648 -11.418  -7.08  -12.76 -8.459 -6.492 -2.783 -3.632 -2.095   
 
[0.54] [0.49] [0.66] [0.82] [0.25] [2.52]**  [1.85]*  [1.90]*  [1.14] [1.96]*  [1.41] [1.01] [0.42] [0.51] [0.30]   
Private bank 
-0.779 -1.047 -1.05  -0.445 -0.372 -12.202  -10.296  -8.981 -9.393 -13.745  -10.485  -7.837 -6.525 -7.607 -7.494   
 
[0.33] [0.43] [0.43] [0.20] [0.16] [1.93]*  [2.02]**  [1.52] [1.67]*  [2.36]**  [1.69]*  [1.19] [0.99] [1.08] [1.12]   
Use  of  hard    2.915      7.412      5.208        
information  [1.69]*      [1.04]      [1.03]        
Use  of  scoring   -1.396      7.266      3.043       
   [1.08]      [2.02]**      [0.79]       
Share  of  SME      0.005      0.171      -0.027      
loans  secured  (%)    [0.17]      [1.16]      [0.31]      
Dec.  of  loan       0.968      1.291      0.434     
approvals     [0.90]      [0.30]      [0.12]     
Dec.  of  risk        -1.531      -6.224      3.241   
management      [1.28]      [1.24]      [0.92]   
Constant  6.918 9.201 8.238 7.547 8.688 79.135  79.93 47.509  83.079  89.226  75.678  75.593  75.474  75.903  73.644  
  [2.57]**  [4.13]*** [2.78]*** [3.42]*** [3.20]*** [5.41]*** [6.97]*** [1.99]*  [7.85]*** [9.12]*** [9.63]*** [9.36]*** [7.49]*** [7.26]*** [6.76]***   
Observations  89 86 80 94 93 71 74 65 77 77 103  102  99 108  107  
Pseudo  R-sq 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02   
F-stat: 
Foreign=Private 
1.12 1.26 1.53 1.36 0.25 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.49 0.62 1.02   
P-value  0.29 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.62 0.84 0.77 0.7  0.69 0.86 0.7  0.79 0.48 0.43 0.32   
Robust z statistics in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: The impact of lending technologies and organizational setup on the extent, size and pricing of lending to SMEs  (continued) 
  Fee (% of loan amount)  Interest rate (% of loan amount) 
Developing   0.658 0.669 0.486 0.689 0.851 6.798 6.778 7.351  6.472 7.212 
  [4.01]*** [4.03]*** [2.01]**  [3.94]*** [4.52]*** [8.52]*** [8.44]*** [6.64]***  [8.02]*** [7.83]*** 
Small firm lending  0.116 0.2  0.138 0.172 0.131 0.879 1.572 0.988  1.329 1.173 
  [0.63] [1.05] [0.67] [0.88] [0.69] [0.90] [1.65] [0.91]  [1.40] [1.19] 
Foreign bank  0.371 0.272 0.333 0.264 0.439 -0.898  -0.944 -1.009  -1.82  -0.609 
  [2.06]**  [1.58] [1.69]*  [1.34] [2.36]**  [0.76] [0.89] [0.79]  [1.60] [0.50] 
Private bank  0.379 0.34  0.461 0.329 0.422 1.84  1.563 1.548  0.445 1.715 
  [1.36] [1.24] [1.69]*  [1.15] [1.56] [1.46] [1.35] [1.26]  [0.36] [1.36] 
Use of hard information  0.045      1.6       
  [0.20]      [1.71]*       
Use of scoring   -0.244      -1.059      
   [1.77]*      [1.45]      
Share of SME loans     0.0008      0.026    
secured (%)    [ 1 . 3 5 ]       [ 1 . 1 2 ]     
Dec. of loan approvals     -0.102       -1.798   
     [0.75]       [2.88]***   
Dec. of risk management      0.166       -0.733 
      [ 1 . 3 7 ]        [ 1 . 0 5 ]  
Constant  -0.057 0.153  -0.457 0.132  -0.29 2.842 4.247 1.7  6.459 3.808 
  [0.20] [0.62] [1.03] [0.43] [1.01] [2.01]**  [3.67]*** [0.93]  [4.55]*** [2.60]** 
Observations  128 128 119 134 133 121 120 107  125 122 
Pseudo R-sq  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03  0.04 0.03 
F-stat: Foreign=Private  0  0.07 0.21 0.07 0.01 5.08 4.89 3.24  4.25 3.88 
P-value  0.98 0.79 0.65 0.79 0.94 0.03 0.03 0.07  0.04 0.05 
Robust z statistics in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A1. The extent, type, and pricing of SME lending across bank ownership types in developing countries.  










(% of SME  
loan amount) 
Interest rate on 
SME loan 
(%) 
Small firm lending  -1.723  -1.391  -2.699  0.151  1.106 
  [0.94]  [0.29]  [0.56]  [0.74]  [1.03] 
Foreign bank  1.629  -5.922  -6.091  0.356  -0.272 
  [0.67]  [1.24]  [0.86]  [1.85]*  [0.23] 
Private bank  0.155  -12.158  -8.602  0.41  2.052 
  [0.06]  [2.28]**  [1.18]  [1.37]  [1.56] 
Constant  8.635  86.559  49.919  0.656  10.342 
  [4.18]***  [20.91]***  [8.00]***  [3.29]***  [10.17]*** 
Observations  82  69  97  122  111 
Pseudo R-sq  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
F-stat:   Foreign=Private  0.49  1.34  0.22  0.04  3.26 
P-value  0.48  0.25  0.64  0.85  0.07 
Robust t-statistics are in brackets. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 28 
 
Figure 1a 
Banks’ definition of small enterprises 












































Banks’ definition of medium-sized enterprises 
(% of banks that define medium-sized enterprises as firms with sales less than amount on horizontal axis) 
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